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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A~4-103(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to Atlas Title and its
employees on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to present any non-speculative evidence
that a recording mistake made by Atlas Title on one parcel of property proximately
caused the damages Plaintiffs suffered when an entirely different parcel of property was
foreclosed?
Standard of Review. "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness." Orvis v. Johnson,
2008UT2,f 6,177 P.3d 600.
Preservation. This issue was preserved below at R. 456-457, 111-123.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no statutes or constitutional provisions which are determinative of
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiffs/Appellants Lynn and Eileen Harding sued numerous defendants,

including Atlas Title Insurance Agency, Inc. and its employees, Randy Kidman and Dave
White, for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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duty, civil conspiracy, negligence, and conversion which Plaintiffs claim arose from the
foreclosure of their security interest in a failed real estate development in Washington
County. .
After discovery, Atlas Title, Kidman, and White brought two separate motions for
summary judgment. One addressed the civil conspiracy claim. The other addressed all
claims and was based on the fact that Plaintiffs could not demonstrate that a recording
error committed by Atlas Title on one parcel of property was the proximate cause of the
damages Plaintiffs claim to have suffered when an entirely different parcel of property
was foreclosed. The district court granted both motions. Plaintiffs now appeal.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Pecan Ridge and the Initial Property Transaction.
This litigation involves a failed residential development in Washington County

known as Pecan Ridge. (R. 115.) Pecan Ridge was the brainchild of a development
group known as Pecan Ridge Partners LLC. (R. 115.) To pursue the Pecan Ridge
development, Pecan Ridge Partners began acquiring property. (R. 115.) One such
property was owned by Plaintiffs/Appellants Lynn and Eileen Harding. (R. 115.) That

<

property is hereinafter referred to as the "Initial Property."
In December 2006, the Hardings sold the Initial Property to Pecan Ridge Partners
i

for the sum of $1.15 million. (R. 115.) The Hardings seller financed a large portion of

<

1

The facts are the undisputed facts before the trial court on summary judgment.
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the purchase price for the Initial Property, and received a trust deed note from Pecan
Ridge Partners in the amount of$800,633.11. (R. 115-116.)
Atlas Title Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Atlas Title") handled the closing and
recording of the transactions related to Pecan Ridge. (R. 116.) The Hardings did not
provide Atlas Title with written recording instructions regarding the recording of the trust
deed against the Initial Property. (R. 116.) Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the
Hardings' trust deed note was to be secured by a trust deed recorded in second position
against the Initial Properly. (R. 116.) The first position trust deed on the Initial Property
was recorded in favor of a group of individual investors who had provided additional
funding to Pecan Ridge. (R. 116.) The first position trust deed secured the sum of
$372,713.64. (R. 214.)
Through inadvertence, Atlas Title did not immediately record the Hardings' trust
deed in second lien position on the Initial Property. (R. 116.) Instead, Atlas Title
recorded two other trust deeds in front of the Hardings. (R. 116.) The beneficiaries of
these two trust deeds were two different investment entities. (R. 116.) These two trust
deeds secured $436,000 and $955,000, respectively. (R. 218, 222.)
Approximately nine months later, the Hardings brought the non-recording to Atlas
Title's attention. (R. 117.) After confirming that the trust deed was not recorded, Atlas
Title immediately recorded the Hardings' trust deed. (R. 117, 403-404.)
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The Land Exchange Transaction, Trust Deed Reconveyances, and Final
Property: Rendering the Initial Property Irrelevant.
There were several options available to Atlas Title to remedy the issue. (R. 404.)
Among other things, these included working with the two investor groups recorded in
front of the Hardings to subordinate their trust deeds to the Hardings. (R. 404.) Atlas
Title could also have tendered the matter to Stewart Title Guaranty Company, which
provided a lender's policy of title insurance on the Initial Property. (R. 404.) The
Hardings did not insist on Atlas Title taking either of these or any other actions to remedy
the mistake. (R. 404.)
Rather, around this same time frame, Pecan Ridge Partners—with Lynn Harding's
assistance—acquired an additional parcel of property, hereinafter referred to as the
"Additional Property." (R. 117.) The Hardings also took a security interest against the
Additional Property in the form of a trust deed securing the sum of $750,000. (R. 117.)
This security position was recorded in second position behind a senior lienholder. (R.
117.)
With the Initial and Additional Properties, Pecan Ridge Partners was now in a
position to acquire the property that it ultimately intended to develop. (R. 117.) To that
end, Pecan Ridge Partners combined the Initial and Additional Properties for a land
exchange with the local special service district, Ash Creek Special Service District. (R.
117.) To accomplish this exchange, Pecan Ridge obtained reconveyances of the trust
deeds recorded against the Initial and Additional Properties. (R. 117.) This included a
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reconveyance of the Hardings' two trust deeds, which Atlas Title reconveyed pursuant to
written instruction from the Hardings. (R. 117, 252, 256.)
Through the exchange, Pecan Ridge acquired a new piece of property—the "Final
Property"—that it intended to develop into the Pecan Ridge development. (R. 118.) The
Hardings' loans to Pecan Ridge were then secured by the Final Property in the form of a
trust deed securing the amount of $1,550,633.10. (R. 118.)
The Hardings' trust deed was recorded in second position on the Final Property,
where the Hardings instructed Atlas Title to put it. (R. 118.) In fact, the Hardings signed
Lender's Closing Instructions to Atlas Title stating: "Lynn and Eileen Harding also
understand that upon recordation of the new Trust Deed for the property described in
'Exhibit B-l' the new recorded Trust Deed will be in second lien position on the property
described in 'Exhibit B-l.'" (R. 118, 275.) The property described as Exhibit B-l in the
Lender's Closing Instructions, of course, was the Final Property. (R. 118, 275.) The
Flardings' trust deed was behind the first trust deed of yet another investor group. (R.
118.) The first trust deed secured the sum of $625,000. (R. 298.)
Thus, after the reconveyancing, property exchanges, and recording of the new trust
deeds, the Hardings ended up with a second position trust deed on the Final Property—
exactly where they intended to be all along. (R. 118.)

This amount is the total combined amount of the Hardings' notes for the Initial
Property ($800,633.11) and Additional Property ($750,000).
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The Economy Tanks, the Development Fails, Pecan Ridge Partners Defaults,
and the First Trust Deed is Foreclosed.
It was around this same time that the real estate and financial credit crisis began
sweeping the nation, hitting the Washington County housing market particularly hard.
(R. 119.) Like many developments during this time period, Pecan Ridge was on
borrowed time. (R. 119.) Feeling the effects of the economic crisis and failing
Washington County real estate market, funding soon ran out and the development came
to a grinding halt. (R. 119.) Defendant/Appellee Scott Wilson, a principal of Pecan
Ridge Partners, explained it to the Hardings this way:
. . . . Despite our best efforts we were not able to get the project funded. We
leveraged every resource we had to try and make it work. It did not...
As you are fully aware, we are in unprecedented financial times - the worst many
of us have ever seen - some say the worst there has ever been. This project and all
of us involved have been caught in the devastating effects of the markets
downward spiral. The project and company ran out of options for funding.
Funding dried up - it went away - we tried everything we could to get the project
funded and the funding markets simply stopped lending on residential projects,
not only locally but also on a national basis.
.... We were committed to what we felt was a great real estate project and what
many others felt was the best project in the entire area. We dedicated several
years of our lives to make this work. Unfortunately for all of us it didn't.
(R. 119-120.)
Unable to meet its financial obligations, Pecan Ridge Partners defaulted on the
loan secured by the first trust deed against the Final Property. (R. 120.) This resulted in
a foreclosure of the first position trust deed. (R. 120.)
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With their security in the Final Property wiped out by the foreclosure of the senior
trust deed, the Hardings responded by suing practically everybody that was associated
with the transaction: Pecan Ridge Partners, its principals, its real estate agent, as well as
Atlas Title and its employees, Randy Kidman and Dave White. (R. 1, 54, 120.)
The Lawsuit and Summary Judgment.
The specific claims the Hardings made against Atlas Title, Kidman, and White
(collectively the 'Title Defendants") were for breach of contract, breach of good faith and
fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, negligence, and conversion. (R.
54-63.) The Hardings sought nearly $2.5 million in damages. (R. 62.)
After discovery, the Title Defendants brought two concurrent motions for
summary judgment. (R. I l l , 125.) One addressed the civil conspiracy claim. (R. 125146.) The other addressed all claims and was based on the fact that the Hardings could
not demonstrate that Atlas Title's error was the proximate cause of the damages they later
suffered as a result of the default and foreclosure. (R. 111-123.)
On the issue of causation, the Title Defendants argued that any error made by
Atlas Title in the recording of the Hardings' trust deed was cured and rendered irrelevant
by the subsequent reconveyance, property exchange, and the recording of the subsequent
trust deed in second position, all pursuant to the Hardings' instructions. (R. 121-123.)
The undisputed facts demonstrated that the Hardings were damaged when Pecan Ridge
Partners defaulted on its loan with the senior lienholder, foreclosing out the Hardings'
second place trust deed, and thereafter failing to pay the Hardings on the underlying note.
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{Id.) There was no evidence that the Title Defendants had anything to do with these
defaults or foreclosure. {Id.)
The Hardings submitted a joint opposition memorandum to the Title Defendants5
motions. (R. 361-373.) Regarding causation, they argued that but for Atlas Title's
mistake, they never would have been damaged. (R. 371-372.) The Title Defendants
replied that the Hardings causation argument was purely speculative. (R. 406-430.)
The trial court agreed with the Title Defendants, and granted both motions for
summary judgment. (R. 456-457.) It reasoned that the Hardings did not meet their
burden of demonstrating causation because "on the facts and evidence presented [this]
could not be done without engaging in impermissible speculation." (R. 457.) The trial
court also granted summary judgment on the conspiracy claim because the Hardings
presented "no clear and convincing evidence ... on which a reasonable fact finder could
conclude that [the Hardings] meet each of the elements of a civil conspiracy." (R. 457.)
The Hardings now appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a case where summary judgment worked as it should. Atlas Title made an
error in recording the Hardings' trust deed on the Initial Property. That is not in dispute.
However, it is also undisputed that the error was rendered irrelevant when the Hardings
reconveyed that trust deed to allow for a land exchange on a different parcel of
property—the Final Property. Atlas Title recorded the Hardings' trust deed on the Final
Property in second position, exactly where the Hardings instructed Atlas Title to place it.
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<

What followed is also undisputed: The economic crash struck the Washington
County real estate market; funding dried up; Pecan Ridge Partners defaulted on its loan
obligation to the senior lienholder; the senior lienholder foreclosed; and the downstream
lienholders, including the Hardings, had their security interests wiped out. Pecan Ridge
Partners is now defunct, and the Hardings cannot collect on their loan.
Regardless of whether the Hardings' claims are based in contract or tort, they fail
if the Hardings cannot demonstrate that Atlas Title's error was the proximate cause of
their damages. This they cannot do. '"Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural
and continuous sequence unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT
104, If 22, 990 P.2d 933 (quoting Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996)
(alterations omitted)).
The reconveyance of the trust deed and all the events that followed intervened to
break any connection between Atlas Title's error and the damage the Hardings later
suffered. On that score reasonable persons could not disagree. Therefore, the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment to the Title Defendants. See Harline, 912 P.2d at
439 (reasoning that causation fails as a matter of law and summary judgment is
appropriate "when the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about
the underlying facts or about the application of a legal standard to the facts").
Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, the Hardings' attempt to connect the dots
of causation from Atlas Title's error to the damage caused by the foreclosure by arguing
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that they only released their trust deed on the Initial Property to avoid the effects of Atlas
Title's error, placed it on the Final Property to somehow recoup their losses, and only had
the damage manifest itself when Pecan Ridge Partners defaulted and the senior lienholder
foreclosed its trust deed. As the trial court concluded, this is pure speculation.
There is nothing to suggest that the same result would not have happened without
Atlas Title's error. Rather, it requires speculation that second place on the Initial
Property was somehow better than second place on the Final Property. It requires
speculation that, despite the economy, there would have been no default and foreclosure.
And, barring that, it requires speculation that there would have been some equity left over
to make the Hardings whole even if the error had not occurred.
Further, it requires us to ignore the fact that the Initial Property was held for only a
short period of time. Other property was acquired, combined with the Initial Property,
and swapped for the Final Property, which would become Pecan Ridge. There is nothing
to suggest that this would not have occurred but for Atlas Title's error. We can only
speculate.
Furthermore, the Hardings' argument impermissibly ignores what they did or
could have done to avoid the loss. For example, if releasing the trust deed on the Initial
Property was to their detriment—as they argue—they should not have agreed to release
it. They could have refused to release their trust deeds against the Initial and Additional
Properties until they were paid in full on the underlying obligation. They did not. They
could have refused to agree to the Ash Creek land exchange until they were fully
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compensated. They did not. They could have insisted that Atlas Title remedy the error.
They did not. Instead, they released their trust deed and instructed Atlas Title to put them
in second position on the Final Property.
Indeed, as demonstrated by the undisputed facts, the Hardings were never intended
to be in better than second place on any property on which they took a security interest.
It is speculation for them to now claim that they would not have had their second position
security interest foreclosed but for Atlas Title's error. As a result, the trial court correctly
concluded that the Hardings' claims failed as a matter of law. See Harline, 912 P.2d at
439 (stating that causation fails as a matter of law and summary judgment is appropriate
"when the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation").
This Court should affirm.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE "DISPUTED FACTS" IDENTIFIED BY THE HARDINGS
ARE NOT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL.
The Hardings identify what they believe are three fact statements that preclude

entry of summary judgment and warrant reversal. (Appellants' Br. at 10-13.) However,
the brief of our co-Appellees Scott Wilson and Jeremy Larkin (at 9-11) has it right:
These so-called disputes are not material to the issue presented on appeal. The three fact
statements targeted by the Hardings address the following:
•

Whether there were written instructions for the recording of the Hardings'
trust deed on the Initial Property (Fact No. 6);
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•

Whether Atlas Title's failure to immediately record the Hardings5 trust deed
against the Initial Property was the result of inadvertence or something sinister
(Fact No. 8); and

•

Whether Atlas Title "immediately" recorded the trust deed after the Hardings
first brought the recording issue to Atlas Title's attention or whether it was a
week or so after (Fact No. 10).

None of these attempted disputes are material to the causation issue now on
appeal. The initial recording instructions are not material because the Hardings do not
dispute that they were supposed be in second position on the Initial Property. The reason
Atlas Title did not immediately record the Hardings' trust deed in second position against
the Initial Property and whether Atlas Title recorded that trust deed "immediately" after
the issue was brought to its attention or within a few weeks thereafter are also not
material. The argument section of the Hardings' brief bears this out, as there is no
analysis demonstrating how these supposed fact disputes warrant reversal of the trial
court's causation determination.
"[T]he mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole does not
preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of
the case." Morgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). See also
Sanns v. Butter field Ford, 2004 UT App 203, If 6, 94 P.3d 301 (the "mere existence of
genuine issues of fact... does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues
are immaterial to resolution of the case") (citation and quotation omitted); Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Because these alleged disputed facts are not material to the resolution of the
i
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causation issue, they cannot form the basis for reversing the trial court's entry of
summary judgment.
To be sure, these fact statements were presented by the Title Defendants primarily
in connection with their summary judgment motion on the Hardings' civil conspiracy
claim. (R. 125, 131-133.)4 The Hardings submitted a joint opposition to both motions,
attempting to dispute these facts in an effort to keep their conspiracy claim alive. (R.
361-367, 372-373.) But, as indicated at page 4 of their brief, the Hardings "do not
contest" summary judgment on the conspiracy claim. (Appellants' Br. at 4.) As a result
of their failure to brief or otherwise appeal entry of summary judgment on the conspiracy
claim, they have abandoned that issue. See Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Their fact disputes are not material.

3

Moreover, even if these attempted disputes are material to the causation
motion—and they are not—the Hardings did not properly dispute these fact statements
before the trial court in the first instance. As the Title Defendants argued below, the
Hardings' responses to these fact statements were insufficient to put them in dispute. To
properly dispute a fact statement, a non-movant is required to offer a direct counter to
that statement. See Johnson v. Hermes Assocs.y Ltd., 2005 UT 82, ^ 24, 128 P.3d 1151.
None of the Hardings' responses to the fact statements in question constitute a direct
counter. Rather, they consist of drawn out commentary, recharacterize each statement,
and give long recitations of conclusory opinion and argument. That is not providing a
direct counter and, "[ajbsent a direct counter," the statement is undisputed. Id. % 24.
For ease of reference, we submitted identical fact statements and a joint set of
exhibits to the trial court in both summary judgment motions. (R. 131-136, 115-120,
148.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IL

A TRIAL COURT MAY DECIDE CAUSATION ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The Hardings begin their argument by devoting over six pages of their brief (at 8-

10, 14-18) assailing summary judgment generally and cherry picking quotations from
opinions to make it appear as though summary judgment is never appropriate on the issue
of causation. That is not true.
For starters, "[sjummary judgment of lawsuits is a valuable and necessary tool in a
judicial system such as ours, which strives for the efficient and timely resolution of legal
disputes. Granting summary judgment saves the parties and the courts the time and
expense of a full-blown trial.5' Wycalls v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Indeed, "[t]he purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the time,
trouble, and expense of trial when it is clear as a matter of law that the party ruled against
is not entitled to prevail." Amjacs Interwest, Inv. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54
(Utah 1981).
The value and purpose of summary judgment is not diminished simply because the
issue involves causation. The Utah Supreme Court flat rejected that suggestion in
Harllne v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996): "We therefore reject Harline's first
contention that the presence of an issue of proximate cause precludes summary
judgment." Id. at 439. See also, e.g., Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246
(Utah 1985) (affirming summary judgment on causation); Thurston v. Workers Comp.
Fund, 2003 UT App 438,1fl[ 14, 23, 83 P.3d 391 (affirming summary judgment on
proximate cause issue); Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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App. 1995) (affirming summary judgment on causation issue where plaintiff could not
show cause of injury without speculating). Thus, the Hardings attack on summary
judgment and selective quotations from case law are not sufficient to overturn the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.5
Rather, summary judgment is always appropriate where there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). As set forth below, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
Title Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
III.

ATLAS TITLE'S FAILURE TO RECORD THE TRUST DEED AGAINST
THE INITIAL PROPERTY IS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
HARDINGS5 DAMAGES.
A.

Proximate Cause.

The Hardings alleged five claims against the Title Defendants: breach of contract,
breach of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and
conversion. (R. 54-62.)6 They seek nearly $2.5 million in damages. (R. 62-63.)
Whether based in contract or tort, each of these claims has a common and essential
element: proximate cause. See Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104,ffij19-22, 990 P.2d 933
(proximate cause standard in contract cases); Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund,

5

We believe the brief and arguments of our co-Appellees Wilson and Larkin have
adequately distinguished the principal cases relied on by the Hardings and therefore find
it unnecessarily duplicative to restate them here. Rather, we join in those arguments.
As noted above, the sixth claim for conspiracy was decided on separate grounds
(R. 457) and not appealed. See Appellants' Br. at 4. Therefore, the Hardings have
abandoned the conspiracy claim. See Pixton, 809 P.2d at 751.
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2003 UT App 438,ffif20-23, 83 P.3d 391 (citing Mahmood and reasoning that proximate
cause standard is the same whether based on contract or tort).
'"Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred."5 Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, ^ 22 (quoting Harline, 912
P.2d at 439 (alterations omitted)). Though determining proximate cause is generally a
question of fact left for the fact finder, the issue may be decided by the court as a matter
of law on summary judgment where the "facts fall on either of two opposite ends of a
factual continuum." Harline, 912 P.2d at 439. These are: "(i) when the facts are so clear
that reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the
application of a legal standard to the facts, and (ii) when the proximate cause of an injury
is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law." Id.
The Title Defendants based their summary judgment motion on the grounds that
the Hardings5 claims against the Title Defendants fall at the first end of the continuum.
The Hardings responded below—and argue on appeal—that but for Atlas Title's error
they would not have been damaged. As the trial court correctly concluded, the Hardings'
argument simply pulled the matter to the opposite end of the continuum, thereby resulting
in summary judgment for the Title Defendants. As set forth below, at either end of the
continuum, summary judgment should be affirmed.
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B.

Reasonable People Could Not Disagree About the Cause of the
Hardings' Damages.

Each of the Hardings' claims against the Title Defendants is premised on the
assumption that the failure to timely record the trust deed in second position against the
Initial Property was the proximate cause of the Hardings' damages. The undisputed facts
show otherwise.
The failure to timely record the Hardings' trust deed on the Initial Property is
irrelevant. There was no default on any loan for the Initial Property. The Hardings, as
junior lien holders on the Initial Property, did not have their security interest wiped out by
a foreclosure of a senior interest thereby leaving them without security. Thus, the
"damage" caused by Atlas Title's recording error was completely hypothetical. And it
would remain a hypothetical because the Initial Property was not intended for the final
development stage.
Rather, it was combined with the Additional Property and swapped with a special
service district for an entirely separate parcel—the Final Property. To that end, the
lienholders, including the Hardings, reconveyed their interests on the Final and
Additional Properties to make the exchange happen. Atlas Title then followed the
Hardings' written instructions by placing them in second position on the Final Property.
Atlas Title's recording error became irrelevant the minute the Hardings requested the
reconveyance. See Utah Code § 57-1-33.1(1 )(a) ("When an obligation secured by a trust
deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary,
reconvey the trust property."). Those acts re-set the frame of the transaction.
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What is not hypothetical and is relevant is what undisputedly happened next. The
economy crashed and real estate funding dried up. Pecan Ridge Partners defaulted on its
loan to the senior lienholder. The senior lienholder foreclosed on the Final Property.
That foreclosure wiped out the security interests of junior lienholders, including the
Hardings. It is unexceptional that anyone who takes anything other than a senior lien
position on collateral runs the risk of having their security foreclosed out by the senior
lienholder. See 53 C.J.S. Liens § 50 (West 2010) (recognizing that "foreclosure by a
senior lienor often wipes out junior lien interest in the same collateral").
Atlas Title's recording error on the now irrelevant Initial Property did not cause
these events to occur. To connect the dots of causation back to the error, the Court would
have to ignore all of these intervening events. But it cannot, because without these
intervening events there is no damage. That much is beyond dispute. These undisputed
facts establish a clear break in any causal link between Atlas Title's error and the damage
suffered by the Hardings. These are the supervening events wholly unrelated to the
error—the "efficient intervening causes" which break the natural and continuous
sequence of events and, by definition, defeat proximate cause. Mahmood, 1999 UT 104,
f 22; Harline, 912 P.2d at 439.
And, to be clear, while the foreclosure by the senior lienholder left the Hardings
unsecured, it did not extinguish the note from Pecan Ridge Partners. See 53 C.J.S. Liens
§ 50 (the "extinguishment of the junior lien on the property, however, does not discharge
the debtor's underlying obligation to the junior lien creditors"). It only meant that the
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Hardings were left to pursue Pecan Ridge Partners directly on the underlying contractual
obligation.
We are only entrenched in litigation because the Hardings do not like that remedy.
Pecan Ridge Partners is now defunct so the Hardings train their fire on the only going
concern—Atlas Title—and the various individuals Kidman, White, Wilson, and Larkin
associated with Atlas Title and Pecan Ridge Partners. But the causation analysis does not
change because the plaintiff does not like its remedy. This case is, and always has been,
a simple breach of contract case against Pecan Ridge Partners. Pecan Ridge Partners'
performance (or lack thereof) has nothing to do with the conduct of the Title Defendants.
On that score, reasonable minds cannot differ. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment to the Title Defendants. See Harline, 912 P.2d at 439. This
Court should affirm.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Hardings9 "Evidence"
of Causation was Impermissibly Speculative.

Not surprisingly, the Hardings don't see it that way. In their view, if a defendant
commits a wrong then it is responsible for all damages suffered by the plaintiff thereafter,
regardless of what the damages actually are and what caused them. In an effort to link up

7

Although the trial court did not base its ultimate decision on this ground, "it is
well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action[.]'" Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Tj 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v.
Federated MWc Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969)). Because this was
the primary basis for the Title Defendants' summary judgment motion below, the Court
may use at the basis to affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
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Atlas Title's error with the damages they suffered, the Hardings now claim that the
reconveyance was nothing more than a "mitigation" effort, and that they only released the
trust deed on the Initial Property because of Atlas Title's error. (Appellants' Br. at 20,
22.) In other words, the Hardings present a "chain of events" theory, claiming that but
for Atlas Title's error they never would have suffered the damage for which they now
complain. The trial court correctly rejected this argument as impermissible speculation.
So, too, should this Court.
1.

Causation built on speculation fails as a matter of law.

Our case law makes clear that it is not enough to simply argue a but for, "chain of
events" theory to defeat summary judgment. Rather, there must be a direct causal link
between the error committed and the damage suffered. For example, in Goebel v. Salt
Lake City Southern R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, 104 P.3d 1185, the plaintiff was injured when
he was riding his bike and lodged the front tire into a gap at a railroad crossing. See id.
TFU 4, 6, 13. He argued that the proximate cause of his injuries resulted from a
protuberance on the crossing that caused him to swerve his bike into the gap, which, in
turn, caused him to wreck and suffer injury. See id. ff 4, 6, 13. Notwithstanding the
plaintiffs argument that he only steered into the gap to avoid the protuberance, "this does
not mean that the existence of the protuberance necessarily forced [the plaintiff] to steer
Q

into the gap." Id. f 13. Affirming the trial court's directed verdict, the Supreme Court

8

Though Geobel is a directed verdict case, there is no practical difference in the
standards for evaluating summary judgments and directed verdicts. See Mahmood, 1999
UT 104, f 16. On a motion for directed verdict, like summary judgment, the trial court
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reasoned that "[t]he protuberance was no more a cause of [the plaintiffs] accident than
his decision to ride his bicycle that day, or the weather. After reviewing the evidence, we
agree with the trial court... that [the plaintiff] could have steered his bicycle into the gap
regardless of whether the protuberance existed at all." Id. ^ 13.
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), the Court affirmed
summary judgment because, even though the plaintiff could establish the defendant's
negligence, there was no "direct evidence" that any of the negligent acts resulted in the
injury that the plaintiff ultimately suffered. See id. at 246. Moreover, the Court would
not allow the plaintiff to put the case before a jury to permit the jury to speculate on
whether the defendant's negligent acts caused the injury or whether the injury would
have resulted despite the negligent acts. See id.
Similarly, in Thurston, 2003 UT App 438, this Court affirmed summary judgment
on the issue of causation on the plaintiffs tort and contract claims. See id. Y[f 20, 23.
There, the plaintiffs sued for the death of an individual under the medical care of the
defendants. The plaintiffs argued, like the Hardings do here, that "but for Defendants'
acts," there would have been no injury. Id. ^ 23. However, the "but for" was based on
speculation that if the plaintiff had received better medical care, his demise could have
been prevented. See id. % 20. This Court held that the "Defendants' acts, whether
breaches of contract or torts, must be causally linked to Plaintiffs' damages." Id. *| 23.
does not weigh evidence, must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and can only enter a directed verdict when it is "able to conclude, as a
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from
the evidence presented ...." Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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The best the plaintiff could do, however, was speculate that better medical care would
have precluded the death. See id. fjf 20, 23.
In this case, the Hardings insist that a jury must decide whether Atlas Title's error
was the proximate of the injuries they suffered. But their "but for'5 argument fairs no
better than the failed arguments in the preceding cases. To borrow from Goebel, the
evidence shows that the Hardings were steering their bike into the gap regardless of Atlas
Title's error.
Here, the Hardings ignore the fact that the Initial Property was held for only a
short period of time. It would not become the Pecan Ridge development. With the
assistance of Lynn Harding, other property was acquired, combined with the Initial
Property, and swapped for the Final Property, which would become Pecan Ridge. There
is nothing to suggest that this would not have occurred but for Atlas Title's error and it
may not be assumed in the Hardings' favor simply because this is a summary judgment
motion. See Mountain West Surgical Center, L.L.C v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT
91, If 10, 173 P.3d 1276 ("The court must view all facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, but it may not assume facts for which no evidence is
offered.").
Thus, the Hardings could have and likely would have ended up in second place on
the Final Property regardless of Atlas Title's error. As demonstrated by the undisputed
facts, they were never intended to be in better than second place on any property on
which they took a security interest. It is speculation for them to now claim that they
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would not have lost their security but for the error. And they can't escape speculation by
claiming that they were only attempting to avoid the effects of Atlas Title's error. Atlas
Title's error was no more the cause of their damage than the Hardings' decision to seller
finance the sale of the Initial Property to Pecan Ridge Partners or their decision to accept
nothing better than a second place security position on any property securing that
financing.
Further highlighting the speculative nature of the Hardings' causation argument is
to assume that no error had occurred and that the Hardings had what they wanted: a
second position trust deed on the Initial Property. We would have to speculate—on top
of everything else—that the Initial Property, unlike every other property in Washington
County, including the Final Property, would have held its value thus leaving something
for the Hardings in the event of a foreclosure of the trust deed in front of them. But there
was nothing special about the Initial Property to show that it was the one and only piece
of property immune to market forces. And the Hardings provided no evidence to show
otherwise.9
Moreover, there is no evidence to show that the housing market crash, Pecan
Ridge Partners' default, the subsequent foreclosure by a senior lienholder, dropping
9

Even giving the Hardings the benefit of the doubt and every possible inference,
the difference between the trust deed ahead of them on the Initial Property and the trust
deed ahead of them on the Final Property was $252,286.33. Yet, the Hardings seek
nearly $2.5 million in damages against the Title Defendants. They do not explain how
they get to this figure and how Atlas Title's error took them there. Moreover, even taking
the $252,286.33 difference into account, the Hardings submitted no competent evidence
that the ultimate foreclosure would have left enough equity in any property to cover the
difference.
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property values, and erasure of the Hardings' second position security interest would not
have occurred if the Hardings were secured in second position on the Initial Property. To
conclude otherwise is purely speculative. Consequently, as in Thurston and Mitchell, the
trial court was correct in granting summary judgment as a matter of law.
2.

The Hardings' causation theory impermissibly ignores what
they did and could have done to avoid the injury.

Another fatal flaw in the Hardings' causation argument is that it asks the Court to
ignore what they actually did do and what they could have done, which keeps their
causation argument at the speculation end of the continuum. This is aptly demonstrated
by Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104. Mahmood involved a plaintiff and defendant who
entered into a series of agreements, each of which called upon the defendant to make loan
payments to a third party. See id. If! 3, 8. The plaintiff had pledged his own property to
secure the loans and, when the defendant breached and failed to pay, the third party
lender began foreclosure proceedings. See id. %% 4-5. To stave off foreclosure, the
plaintiff re-financed the loan on a short term note. See id. ! 24. He also entered into a
settlement agreement with the defendant. See id. That agreement required the defendant
to make monthly payments to the third party lender on the plaintiffs behalf, thus giving
the plaintiff time to sell or develop the property, or to re-finance the loan before a balloon
payment came due. See id. f 25.
The defendant eventually breached the settlement agreement by failing to make all
monthly payments to the third party lender. See id. ^f 8. This resulted in the initiation of
new foreclosure proceedings. See id. <[f 8. The plaintiff then negotiated with the third
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party lender, picked up the monthly payments, and made every effort to market and
develop the property. See id. ^ 9 - 1 1 , 26. However, the plaintiff was unable to make the
scheduled balloon payment and lost the property to foreclosure. See id. ^ | 15, 26.
The plaintiff then sued the defendant claiming that the defendant's breach of the
settlement agreement caused the plaintiff to lose his equity in the foreclosed property.
See id. ^ 12. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on that
issue. See id.10 The trial court accepted the plaintiffs argument—which is similar to the
argument the Hardings advance here—that the breach of the settlement agreement started
a "chain of events which seriously impaired his ability to save the ... property by
refinancing or selling it before the balloon payment on the [third party] loan became
due." Id. ^| 27. The plaintiff sought and the jury awarded, inter alia, damages in the form
of his lost equity in the property. See id. % 14.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the matter never should have gone
to the jury. See id. ^ 39. Although there was evidence that the defendant's breach made
it more difficult on the plaintiff, there were alternatives available to the plaintiff which
the plaintiff did not pursue, including simply re-fmancing with another lender. See id. ^
28. In other words, there was no evidence establishing the casual link between the breach
and the foreclosure—namely, that the breach, by itself, prevented the plaintiff from refinancing the property, paying back the loan, or otherwise saving the property from
foreclosure. See id. ^ 28. Instead, the plaintiffs "but for the breach," chain of events
Mahmood is also a directed verdict case. However, as noted above, that is a
distinction without a difference for purposes of this appeal.
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theory required the fact finder to engage in "unsupported speculation." Id. The Court
would not ignore what the plaintiff actually did and could have done in response to any
breach to protect himself from the harm.
The present case is no different. Indeed, most revealing about the Hardings5 claim
that the error caused their damages is to view it through the lens of what the Hardings
actually did and could have done but did not do, as opposed to simply accepting what
they surmise was the chain of events that followed the error. The Hardings argue that
"but for Atlas Title's failure to record, the [they] would never had agreed to release their
deed." (Appellants' Br. at 21.) If releasing the trust deed on the Initial Property was to
their detriment—as they argue—they should not have agreed to release it. If they were
damaged by the recording error, they should have pursued their legal remedies at that
time. They did not. Instead, they did release their trust deed. In fact, they went out with
Pecan Ridge Partners to secure additional property for the development.
Moreover, they could have refused to release their trust deeds against the Initial
and Additional Properties until they were paid in full on the underlying obligation. They
did not. They could have insisted on additional security in the form of personal
guarantees from the principals of Pecan Ridge Partners. They did not. They could have
refused to agree to the Ash Creek land exchange until they were folly compensated.
They did not. Like the plaintiff in Mahmood, the Hardings failed to pursue available and
reasonable actions to avoid the harm, choosing instead to put it all at the feet of the Title
Defendants when things did not go their way.
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And there's more. The Hardings could have insisted that Atlas Title fix the error.
The options were there for that to happen. Atlas Title could have worked with those
recorded in front of the Hardings to subordinate their interests to the Hardings. The
matter could have been tendered to the title insurer. Certainly, these are things that Atlas
Title would have done and stood ready to do in order to protect itself from the effects of
its error—something that cannot be ignored in determining causation. See Zion Factory
Stores Holding v. Lawrence, 2005 UT App 361,fflf15-16, 121 P.3d 53 (reversing court
for engaging in speculation by focusing on the plaintiffs harm and ignoring what the
defendant may have done in the transaction to protect himself). But none of these actions
were taken because the Hardings instructed Atlas Title to instead release and reconvey
the trust deeds and record a new trust deed in second position against the Final Property.
The Hardings, like the plaintiff in Mahmood, are not entitled come back later, get
in front of a jury, and present speculation about what caused their damage. Rather, like
the plaintiff in Mahmood, there were other things that could have been done to save their
security position on their underlying loans. Like the plaintiff in Mahmood, the Hardings
did not pursue these options. They cannot now un-ring the bell and escape the
consequences of their actions and decisions and force the Title Defendants, the trial court,
and a jury through the time and expense of a trial to present speculative theories about
how they believe Atlas Title's error caused them harm.
The trial court correctly ruled that the Hardings' causation arguments and
evidence are purely speculative. As a result, this Court should affirm summary judgment.
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D.

The Trial Court Properly Applied Summary Judgment Burdens.

The Hardings also argue (at 21) that the trial court impermissibly shifted the
burden to them to come forward with evidence of causation. They argue they only have a
burden at trial, not on summary judgment. The Hardings are wrong.
"A summary judgment movant, on an issue where the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its burden on summary judgment by showing, by
reference to 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,' that there is no genuine issue of material fact.55
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, % 18, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). When
the moving party makes this showing, "the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party,
who cmay not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings,5 but 'must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.555 Id. (quoting Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e)).
The trial court correctly applied the burdens on each party as it relates to summary
judgment. The Hardings, as the plaintiffs, are the party with the burden of proving their
claims at trial—including, as stated above, causation. See Thurston, 2003 UT App 438,
Yi 20-23 (reasoning that plaintiff must demonstrate causation regardless of whether claim
is based on contract or tort). The Title Defendants presented a motion for summary
(

judgment, supported by affidavits, documents, and discovery responses, which
demonstrated that there were no disputed issues of material fact and that they were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R. 111-124, 406-429.) The Hardings never
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argued below (R. 361-373) and do not argue on appeal that the Title Defendants did not
meet their initial burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of material fact
related to the causation issue.
Thus5 after the Title Defendants made their initial showing, the burden shifted to
the Hardings to come forward with "specific facts" showing that there was a genuine
issue for trial. The Hardings did not come forward with specific facts. They came
forward with speculation and conjecture. As detailed above, that is not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD THE HARDINGS5 FINAL
ARGUMENT.
The Hardings tack on a final argument under the heading "Neglect and Summary

Judgment." (Appellants' Br. at 22.) This argument appears to be a retread of their
central theme that summary judgment should not be granted in cases such as this, only
this time "focusing" on the negligence claim. As set forth in detail above, the Hardings
are wrong. Moreover, in light of the fact that this argument is a single paragraph and
fails to indicate how it differs in substance from the Hardings' other arguments on appeal,
the Title Defendants will simply refer the Court to their arguments as set forth above.
What's more, for this reason, the argument should be ignored because it is
inadequately briefed. It is a single paragraph in length and does not contain any analysis.
It says only that the Hardings pleaded negligence and summary judgment is only
appropriate in a "clear cut" case. (Appellants' Br. at 22.) It does not provide any
explanation as to why this is not a "clear cut" case.
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"An issue is inadequately briefed if the argument merely contains bald citations to
authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority.5" Benjamin v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2011 UT 14, \ 31 n.8, 250 P.3d 39
(citations and quotation omitted); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The Hardings' argument
does not measure up to these standards. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998) (declining to address issue "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). The Court should
therefore ignore the Hardings5 final argument. See Seamons v. Brandley, 2011 UT App
434, ^f 5 (per curiam).
CONCLUSION
The trial court should be affirmed.
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